Those of us who have followed football for decades have become accustomed to the complicated and obscure management of football by FIFA, as defined by one of its former presidents, Brazilian Joao Havelange (1974–1998), as a "football multinational." At least since his time in office, everything has revolved around the parameters of large-scale business without any major ethical issues.

However, after the period of "Havelangism," which could also include his successor, the Swiss Joseph Blatter (president between 1998 and 2015), who was previously the secretary general of Brazil, it can be said that we are currently witnessing the absolute deepening of the model, which has particular characteristics that we will try to explain.

It is clear that if there were major corruption cases in the previous cycle (in fact, it ended with the May 2015 raid in Zurich when the so-called "FIFA-Gate" began, leading to the arrest of most leaders of Latin American football, whether from Conmebol or Concacaf, for having received huge bribes from major TV networks to sell them the broadcasting rights at a discount and cancel their competitions, or the highly questionable votes for Russia and Qatar to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups), there was also, at the very least, some intention to respect the rules of the game itself or to defend national teams from the steady advance of powerful European clubs, which were dominating everything in their path.

"I have to manage passions," Blatter used to say, in what seemed like a contradiction in terms because "manage" does not appear to have any point of convergence with passion. However, the Swiss leader, who had to leave his post a few days after starting his last term due to a lack of support from several national leaders, was not mistaken in his idea. On the one hand, there were the businesses, the major sponsors, the sale of rights with lucrative returns (as was proven in the FIFA Gate scandal involving the Latin American leadership), or those acquired through venue elections. But on the other hand, at least these leaders understood that international football was divided into two areas and that it was necessary to strike a balance between them: that of the clubs and that of the national teams.

That leadership had managed to understand a few key things: that the World Cup is the pinnacle event in football and, therefore, the largest business, requiring careful management. This included maintaining a four-year gap between tournaments to preserve the anticipation of this rare event. Simultaneously, recognizing its significance, there was a need for a substantial preparation period for teams, allowing each national team to play a certain number of matches annually in addition to their regular club commitments. It was important not to overburden players with a demanding schedule that could lead to overexertion. Despite facing criticism at the time, another aspect was a cautious approach towards the use of technology, as there was concern that its implementation without careful planning could potentially hinder the sport's development.

With Blatter's departure, and after a brief interregnum by Cameroon's Issa Hayatou as interim FIFA president, the Italian-Swiss Gianni Infantino won the election on February 24, 2016, with Sheikh Salman bin Ebrahim Al-Jalifa coming in second place. The difference between the two was only three votes (88-85), and it was only in the second ballot (115-88) that the European candidate managed to prevail. Infantino's candidacy for the FIFA presidency came about by chance, in the same hotel in Zurich where the FIFA-Gate raid had taken place months earlier, the "Baur Au Lac." There, the key leaders of the two most influential Western confederations, UEFA and CONMEBOL, met with great concern, aiming to find a candidate who would emerge from their own ranks. They feared the possibility of losing football's power to the East and other cultures, which would render everything unmanageable.

The first name to emerge was that of the then president of the Royal Spanish Football Federation (RFEF), Ángel María Villar. Due to his close friendship with the long-standing head of the Argentinean Football Association (AFA) and FIFA's number two, Julio Grondona, Villar had managed to secure a position for his son Gorka (a lawyer) in CONMEBOL, despite not being of South American origin. However, their proposal was met with rejection. Villar provided a strong excuse, citing serious internal problems in his country, to the extent that he ended up paying bail to avoid imprisonment.

At that moment, the "Western" leaders realized that they were facing a significant problem. Blatter and Platini had been suspended due to a corruption scandal, and a high percentage of Latin American leaders were involved in the FIFA-gate scandal. None of them were in a position to take on the responsibility. In fact, during the recent Copa América held in Chile in mid-2015, the hotel booked for the leaders in Santiago de Chile remained empty for the entire month, despite all the rooms being paid for, out of fear of another Interpol raid.

The first name to emerge was that of the then president of the Royal Spanish Football Federation (RFEF), Ángel María Villar. Due to his close friendship with the long-standing head of the Argentinean Football Association (AFA) and FIFA's number two, Julio Grondona, Villar had managed to secure a position for his son Gorka (a lawyer) in CONMEBOL, despite not being of South American origin. However, their proposal was met with rejection. Villar provided a strong excuse, citing serious internal problems in his country, to the extent that he ended up paying bail to avoid imprisonment.

At that moment, the "Western" leaders realized that they were facing a significant problem. Blatter and Platini had been suspended due to a corruption scandal, and a high percentage of Latin American leaders were involved in the FIFA-gate scandal. None of them were in a position to take on the responsibility. In fact, during the recent Copa América held in Chile in mid-2015, the hotel booked for the leaders in Santiago de Chile remained empty for the entire month, despite all the rooms being paid for, out of fear of another Interpol raid.

It is highly unlikely that Blatter would have chosen to live in Qatar a year before the World Cup, allowed an emir to place a cape on the captain of the world champion team during the Cup presentation, or revoked Indonesia's U-20 World Cup bid for refusing Israel's participation, only to award them the U-17 World Cup a few days later. It is also unlikely that Blatter would have accepted the prohibition of beer consumption in the stadiums during the World Cup simply because the host country desired it, stating, "I don't think anyone would die if they didn't drink beer for three hours."

The problem does not solely arise from these actions but also from the fact that when Infantino assumed office, he claimed that his tenure at FIFA would bring about an ethical transformation in the organization's image. During the 2019 Women's World Cup in France, a journalist asked Infantino in a press conference why the TV rights were still held by the same companies that had been found guilty of corruption, having paid bribes instead of promoting wider broadcasting access by selling rights at affordable prices to promote the sport worldwide. His response was that he was "two hundred percent in agreement," but no changes have been made so far. The journalist has been unable to ask the question again despite repeatedly raising their hand during the events in Qatar.

As if resembling previous administrations were not enough, Infantino considered that the first presidential cycle was not complete because he completed the term that Blatter had abruptly ended. Therefore, he believed he still had three more terms to serve, of which he has already completed one full term and has two more to go.

In summary, Infantino's presidency, far from being a renewal in football, represents the continuation of the business practices and vices implemented by Havelange since 1974. However, Infantino's approach involves an even greater emphasis on exploitation, a lack of concern for ethical and sporting matters, and a profound lack of knowledge about football. It is a complete abandonment of the passion for the sport, although it may have occasionally shown itself through the pockets of some of these leaders' suits.

Today, little is said about the influence of club states that can inject unlimited funds into entities dependent on Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, or Saudi Arabia, nor about the oppressive regimes that marginalize women. It also seems inconsequential that a single owner can possess five or six clubs or that powerful groups acquire institutions worldwide. FIFA willingly turns a blind eye to anything necessary to ensure its own perpetuation, with less and less attempt to disguise it. Corruptly managed federations are left untouched if they have friendly leaders, while interventions occur promptly if the leaders are unknown.